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RES GESTAE
EDMUND M. MORGAN*
A multitude of cases creates chaos in this subject. Even so
great a scholar and lawyer as Simon Greenleaf was unable to
clarify the topic when the decisions were fewer and simplei. Mr.
(afterwards Mr. Justice) Pitt Taylor, the author of Taylor on
Evidence, copied Greenleaf word for word; but when in controversy with Mr. Chief Justice Cockburn over Bedinglield's case,
had to confess that his text consisted of words "full of sound,
signifying nothing". He insisted, however, that the definition
which the Chief Justice had framed left him "enveloped in a fog,
dense as that by which I am now, as I write, surrounded." James
Bradley Thayer, after a consideration of the history of the phrase,
worked out a very carefully reasoned theory which, it was said
by his son, "stood the test of his many years of later study."'
Mr. Wigmore, Mr. Thayer's most distinguished disciple, accepts
Air. Thayer's history but completely ignores his theory. And Mr.
Chamberlayne, another of Mr. Thayer's scholarly pupils, only
makes the "confusion worse confounded" in his voluminous work.
The phrase seems to have been introduced in the singular. Mr.
Thayer says it was first used in connection with evidence by
"Garrow and Lord Kenyon-two famously ignorant men", and to
have been seized upon by bench and bar as an expression "which
gave them relief at a pinch . . . did for them what the limbo of
the theologians did for them, what a 'catch-all' does for a busy
housekeeper or an untidy one-some things belonged there, others
might, for purposes of present convenience, be put there." 2 Accordingly, it would be an impossible task to classify the numerous
situations in which evidence has been treated as part of the res
gesta or res gestm, for the singular form very early gave way to
the plural. There are, however, seven classes of cases in which
the phrase is often used as a device for admitting or excluding
evidence, some of them having no element of hearsay involved in
*Acting Dean and Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
'THAirER, LEGAL ESSAYS (1908)

207.

2Id. 244. The essay on Bedingfield's case is found on pages 207-304;
the controversy between Mr. Pitt Taylor and Chief Justice Cockburn is
described on pages 207-219. The essay was originally published in 14
Am. LAW REv. 817, 15 Id. 1, 71 (1880, 1881).
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them; others clearly containing hearsay but declared by the courts
to be free from it; and still others frankly recognized as including
hearsay.
The first consists of cases wherein the words constitute an operative fact-that is, a fact which, by itself or in connection with
others, operates to create legal relations between the parties. Thus,
if words of offer are addressed to an offeree, he is thereby empowered by the offeror to create a legal duty by acceptance. The
offeree by uttering words of rejection destroys his power to create
such a duty. Here the words which are exchanged are important
in themselves; they do not purport to be narratives; their significance in the case is unaffected in any way by the credibility or lack
of credibility of the person who utters them. In the same way,
in an action by a wife against her husband's father for alienation of the husband's affections, when the question is whether the
father uttered words urging his son to continue to live with his
wife or words urging him to desert her, the content of the utterance is material in and of itself. In such a case the New Hampshire Supreme Court said of such statements that they "were more
than a part of the res gestte, they were the res gest ." Numerous
other examples, such as the words alleged to have been uttered
in a slander or a libel, readily come to mind. And it requires no
power of analysis to demonstrate that no hearsay is involved.
In the second group the words are used as circumstantial evidence of a material fact-that is, of an operative fact or a fact
evidential of an operative fact. For example, the defendant desires
to show that his killing of X was in the heat of an insane passion.
He offers to prove that a few minutes before he fired the fatal shot,
his wife had told him that X had ravished her.4 He makes no
offer to show that his wife's statement was true; he may even
concede that it was false, but he insists that he believed it to be
true. Obviously, one method of showing a man's state of mind is
by showing what occurred in his presence. Again, a published
declaration by a party that he is the owner of Blackacre, if offered
to show only that he made the claim, and not that he was the
owner, is circumstantial evidence of an open or notorious claim of
title. As in the first class, the words here are important in themselves when once their utterance is shown; they are not being used
testimonially; their legal effect does not depend in the slightest
degree upon the credibility of the person uttering them. His perception, or memory, or narration, or veracity is in no way in'Caplan v. Caplan, 83 N. H. 318, 326, 142 Atl. 121 (1928).
'See People v. Wood, 126 N. Y. 249, 27 N. E. 362 (1891); cf. People v.
Garfalo, 207 N. Y. 141, 100 N. E. 698 (1912).
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volved. Hence, no hearsay problem arises. In a way, the words
are the things done, the res gestm; and the judges frequently so
name them.
With cases in these two classes, the courts have no real difficulty.
Those in the next category are not quite so simple. In them nonverbal conduct is accompanied by verbal conduct-a nonverbal act
is accompanied by words-and the operative effect or the legal
significance of the nonverbal conduct depends upon the words.
To illustrate, when A hands over to B a chattel and B accepts it,
the transfer may indicate a sale, a bailment, a gift or the return
of a loan. The words accompanying the transfer may resolve the
uncertainty. On the objective theory of legal transactions such as
contracts, the words used are as operative as is the manual transfer of the chattel. They are not narrative; they are not even
circumstantial evidence of the intent of the parties. If the transferor uses words of gift, the transfer will constitute a gift though
he meant to use words of sale or bailment. The distinction between these cases and those of the first class is that here the words
accompany nonverbal conduct, frequently called an act so as to
distinguish it from the words. It was to be expected that the
courts might call such words part of the res gestm, since part of
the things done consists of nonverbal conduct and part, of words.
The distinction between these cases and the fourth group is in
theory sharp and distinct, but in practice is often overlooked.
Here the words accompanying the act of themselves determine its
legal significance; in the fourth group the significance of the nonverbal conduct depends upon the intent with which it is done, and
the words accompanying the nonverbal conduct are evidence of
that intent. If they are a direct statement of the intent, they are,
of course, hearsay, for they constitute an assertion not subject to
cross-examination when made and are offered to prove the truth
of the matter asserted. The credibility of the person uttering them
is all-important. If, however, the words are not a direct statement
of the condition of mind of such person but merely circumstantial
evidence thereof, they may not be hearsay. For instance, the intent with which a will is torn, burned, or obliterated depends not
at all upon the words which accompany it, but upon the intent
with which it was done. If while tearing a will in which X is
named as the sole legatee, the testator declares that X is a forger,
a sneak, and a crook, the declaration will be circumstantial evidence that the testator has an unkindly feeling toward X, and this
in turn will be circumstantial evidence of an intent to revoke the
will. For this purpose, it will not be hearsay under the orthodox
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definition. It may have an important element of hearsay in it, if
the theory of the proponent is that the testator really believed
what he was saying; but it will be quite as relevant if his theory
is that the testator was making such accusations when he knew them
to be untrue. If, however, the testator's words are, "I intend
hereby to revoke this will," they will be offered for their truth
and will be hearsay upon proper analysis under any definition
of hearsay. Similarly, the intention of a person, when moving
from one place to another, may be decisive upon the question
whether he has changed his domicile. His words evidencing that
intention may be hearsay or non-hearsay. In these situations the
courts admit the words, frequently insisting, even when they are
a direct statement of intention, that they are not hearsay because
part of the res gesto. Others, recognizing that the direct declarations of intention are hearsay, nevertheless admit them on the
ground that they derive credit from the accompanying nonverbal
conduct, thus acquiring the requisite guaranty of trustworthiness
for an exception.5
These cases lead directly to that large number of decisions dealing with the admissibility of declarations which accompany nonverbal conduct, the legal significance of which is entirely independent both of the words and of the intention or other state of
mind of the declarant. Furthermore, such a declaration usually
has no relevance or materiality except as evidence of the truth
of the matter asserted in it. And, in addition, the nonverbal conduct of the declarant himself may have no significance in the case;
the conduct which his declaration accompanies may even be that
of another. In myriads of cases such declarations are received. On
what theory? Under what limitations?
Of course, an utterance does not derive any credit from the mere
fact that the person making it is also doing something else at the
same time. In a Connecticut case,6 one question was whether a
woman had funds sufficient to pay a mortgage which it was alleged
that she had paid. Evidence was offered that she had moved a
barrel sitting under the cellar steps and told her daughter that
the money was buried in a pot in the ground and she wanted the
daughter to know where it was. It was insisted that the words
were admissible as part of the res gesto of going down cellar and
doing what she did there. They were rejected. On the other hand,
in a Massachusettes case where plaintiff was suing the sheriff for
'See the discussion in Holyoke v. Estate of Holyoke, 110 Me. 469, 87
Atl. 40 (1913).
'Pinney v. Jones, 64 Conn. 545, 30 Atl. 762 (1894). See also Commonwealth v. Chance, 174 Mass. 245, 54 N. E. 551 (1899).

RES GESTAE
having converted plaintiff's goods by taking them in execution of
a judgment against X, a manufacturer, W was permitted to testify
that some time before the execution he was going through X's
plant with X and asked X where plaintiff's property was and X
pointed out to him the property in question. The Supreme Judicial
Court held this properly admissible as part of the res gestt. 7
Obviously, from this point of view, there is no distinction between these cases. In both, the pointing was of itself entirely
irrelevant, as was the rest of the nonverbal conduct. The accompanying words gave to the conduct all the significance it had in
the case. But in the Massachusetts case the words were admissible
either as a vicarious admission or as a declaration against interest,
and the court used the res gestw language to avoid the necessity
of thinking the matter through. In the Connecticut ease no other
exception to the hearsay rule was applicable. And generally, it
will be found, the courts are in accord with the Connecticut view.
The act which the words accompany must be independently relevant.
In the earlier eases the courts lay great stress upon the element
of contemporaneousness. The words must be contemporaneous with
the act or event and "qualify" or "explain" or "elucidate" or
"reflect light upon" it. As Mr. Thayer put it: "The leading notion in the doctrine, so far as, upon analysis, it has anything to do
with the law of evidence, seems to have been that of withdrawing
from the operation of the hearsay rule declarations of fact which
out,
were very near in time to that which they tended to prove, fill
or illustrate, being at the same time not narrative, but importing
what was then present or but just gone by, and so was open, either
immediately or in the indications of it, to the observation of the
witness who testifies to the declaration, and who can be crossexamined as to those indications. ' 8 For an apparent application
of the doctrine, consider Heg v. Mullen.9 In that case defendant's
car collided with plaintiff's car at a highway intersection. A witness, O'Brien, testified that he was a passenger in defendant's
car. When the car was not far from the crossing, he got up in
the machine, looked at the speedometer and, "I says to the boys,
'I am in no hurry.' I told them I was in no hurry to get to Redondo and I didn't think they were either." First, is this hearsay?
Clearly it was not offered for the truth of the matter literally
asserted in it. Whether O'Brien was in a hurry was entirely
immaterial. But the proposition which he was trying to express
'Pool v. Bridges, 4 Pick. 377 (1826).
THAYEn, op. cit. supra note 1 302.
9115 Wash. 252, 197 Pac. 51 (1921).
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and which "the boys" doubtless understood, and for the truth of
which it was offered, was, "You are driving at a very rapid, an
excessive, rate of speed." And on this analysis, it is hearsay. This
statement was exactly contemporaneous with the conduct upon
which it throws light, the driving of the car along the highway.
What he was talking about was then open to the observation of
O'Brien and of his auditors. If an auditor reported the statement in the witness box, the auditor could be cross-examined fully
not only as to the content of O'Brien's statement but also as to
the objective facts concerning which O'Brien was talking. In
evaluating O'Brien's statement as made in the car, the jury would
not have to rely upon the credibility of the uncross-examined
O'Brien alone: it would have also the credibility of the reporting
witness. O'Brein's memory is not in any way involved. His.narration is no more likely to carry error here than in any other
exception to the hearsay rule. As to his veracity, that is subject
to some check by cross-examination of the reporting witness. Of
course, if O'Brien himself is the reporting witness, the crossexamination will be all the more effective. Besides, the statement
is to a marked degree the spontaneous product of the occurrence,
"operating," as Mr. Justice Somerville of Alabama phrases it,
"upon the visual, auditory or other perceptive senses of the speaker." The declaration is "instinctive, rather than deliberativein short, the reflex product of immediate sensual impressions, unaided by retrospective mental action. These are the indicia of
verity which the law accepts as a substitute for the usual requirements of an oath and opportunity for cross-examination. " 1
In all the cases where the statement is exactly contemporaneous
with the event in question, this reasoning will justify its admission.
In such situations, the less exciting or disturbing the event, the
more trustworthy the declaration because, as the psychologists
assure us after abundant investigation, the greater the excitement
or other mental perturbation, the less accurate the operation of the
perceptive faculties." Contemporaneousness, not spontaneity, is
the test. Indeed, Mr. Thayer, after an exhaustive examination of
the authorities up to the time he first wrote in 1880, seems to have
been convinced that there was no other theory which would explain the decisions; and that the questionable decisions were due
to an unwarranted expansion of the meaning of contemporaneousness. Of course, he had to concede that it would be impracticable
"°IlIlnois Central R. R. Co. v. Lowery, 184 Ala. 443, 448, 63 So. 952
(1913).
"See Hutchins and Slesinger, Spontaneous Exclamations (1928) 28
COL. L. REv. 432.
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to insist on exact contemporaneousness-he says "very near in
time to that which they tended to prove, fill out or illustrate,"
importing that which "was open, either immediately or in the indications of it, to the observation of the witness who testifies..."
But any appreciable interval would wreck the guaranties of trustworthiness. And in numerous modern opinions there is such an
insistence upon substantial contemporaneousness that Mr. Thayer's
theory will still explain the vast majority of cases. 2
But not all. There are a few cases where testimony like that in
Heg v. Mullen has been excluded.13 Heg v. Mullen seemed to be a
demonstration that there were a few judges who could use,.the
doctrine of res gestm without being led into the obvious error of
believing, in accident cases, that the res gesta was the accident
itself; who knew that for purposes of evidence, an evidential fact
might well be a res gesta. Of course, the Washington Court did
not cite Thayer, but they seemed to be applying the very same
reasoning which he found to run through the decisions half a century earlier. In 1926, however, it wrecked that demonstration. It
then declared in Barnett v. Bull,' that in Heg v. Mullen the res
gesta was the collision and that the declaration was practically
contemporaneous with it for, so the court said, it was made just
a moment before by a person who was in one of the colliding
cars; and that even so the court had gone pretty well toward the
limit in admitting it. 5 The opinion does not explain just why
O'Brien's statement at a time when, so far as appeared, he did
not apprehend a collision and was totally unaware that he was
approaching the scene of an accident in which he was to participate as an innocent passenger, could be made any the more trustworthy by the subsequent occurrence. The court was no doubt influenced by the fact that in most cases the declarations are made
after the accident; but it did not note that in most of them the

"Upon this theory words "elucidating" or "reflecting light upon" an
object or external static condition, uttered while the speaker was viewIng or otherwise exercising any of his senses with reference to the object
or condition, should be admissible. May DuBost v. Beresford, 2 Camp.
511 (K, B. 1810) .be thus explained? See the following cases, where the
court's ruling contained no suggestion of such a theory; Chase v. City of
Lowell, 151 Mass. 422, 24 N. E. 212 (1890), admitting contemporaneous
statements as to exposed and decayed condition of roots of tree; Lund v.
Tyngsborough, 9 Cush. (Mass.) 36 (1851), excluding contemporaneous
statements by a physician as -to condition of ankle; The Gresham Hotel
Company, Limited v. Manning, I. R. 1 C. L. 125 (Q. B. Ireland, 1867),
excluding contemporaneous statements of prospective guests as to dark
condition of room.
"Wrage v. King, 114 Kan. 539, 220 Pac. 259 (1923), (1924) 22 MicH. L.
REv. 843; Gouin v. Ryder, 38 R. I. 31, 94 Atl. 670 (1915).
1141 Wash. 139, 250 Pac. 955 (1926).
"The court made a similar remark as to the evidence admitted in
Mathewson v. Olmstead, 126 Wash. 269, 218 Pac. 226 (1923).
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theory of decision is not contemporaneousness, that there is no consideration given to the fact that the truth of the statement of the
declarant can be checked up by cross-examination of the witness
who reports it in court. By its reasoning it seems to make contemporaneousness with the accident the test of admissibility of a
statement, which does not have to do with the accident but with the
events preceding it and which was not produced by the accident.
Thus it seems to erect a theory which harmonizes neither with
Thayer nor with Wigmore.
Mr. Wig more's theory makes contemporaneousness important
only as evidence of spontaneity. He founds it upon the case of
Tkompson v. Trevanion,'6 a nisi prius case decided in 1694, in
which Lord Holt ruled in an action for assault and battery of
plaintiff's wife, "that what the wife said immediate upon the hurt
received, and before that she had time to devise or contrive anything for her own advantage might be given in evidence." Herein Mr. Wigmore finds all the requisites for his exception. (1)
There is a startling occurrence. This means an occurrence which
startles the speaker, puts him under a stress of nervous excitement. (2) The statement is made before there is time to fabricate. That is to say, while the speaker is still laboring under the
stress of the nervous excitement. In this connection, IV[r. Wigmore
describes all requirements of contemporaneousness as spurious
limitations, due to a confusion between these cases and those above
described as the third and fourth classes--those where the legal
significance of the nonverbal conduct depends either upon the
words accompanying it or upon the intent of the person exhibiting
the conduct. (3) The statement must concern or relate to the
startling occurrence.
Since the publication of Mr. Wigmore's first edition, this theory
has been widely adopted so that it can now be said to represent
the overwhelming weight of authority. This is not to say that there
is such great harmony in its application. 17 There is a trend toward
unanimity in requiring the startling occurrence. This seems a
decided mistake, for it insists upon an element which has a positive
tendency to produce inaccurate observation-and inaccuracy of
observation is one of the greatest obstacles to the discovery of facts
in litigation. To the requirement that the speaker shall be laboring under the stress of nervous excitement, some courts add the
".Ski. 402 (K. B.). In like manner in R. v. Foster, 6 C. & P. 325
(1834), a statement, made by an injured man immediately after he was
knocked down, as to what struck him was admitted. But this was doubted
by Cockburn, C. J. in R. v. Bedingfield, 14 Cox. C. C. 341 (1879).
"Compare People v. Del Vermo, 192 N. Y. 470, 85 N. E. 690 (1908), with
Greener v. General Electric Co., 209 N. Y. 135, 102 N. E. 527 (1913).
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limitation that the speaker must himself have been a participant
in the occurrence, as the actor or the victim. The role of mere
bystander will not suffice. This may likewise be due to a borrowing
from eases of our third and fourth classes. The majority are now
receiving declarations of bystanders.1 8 The third requisite, that
the statement must concern the startling occurrence, is usually
accepted. In most cases there is no attempt to introduce matter
irrelevant to the occurrence. The issue is raised where the statement concerns a previous event, which has considerable bearing
upon the occurrence producing the excitement under which the
speaker is laboring. Thus, in an English case' 9 where a plaintiff
passenger was injured by a tramcar leaving the track, another
passenger exclaimed that the driver ought to be reported, and the
conductor replied that the driver had been reported, for he had
"been off the line five or six times that day." It was held that the
conductor's statement was inadmissible because it had nothing to
do with the startling occurrence. There are other cases to the same
effect. Mr. Chamberlayne says that the courts are more liberal in
this respect in poisoning cases. With this the Louisiana court expressly disagreed. 20 A United States Circuit Court of Appeals,
however, has gone far toward justifying TMAr.
Chamberlayne's
statement. In an action upon a life insurance policy defendant alleged a conspiracy to defraud by procuring the insurance and
murdering the assured. After introducing evidence which would
justify the jury in finding a conspiracy between plaintiff, Jack,
and one Dr. Lipscomb, and evidence that Dr. Lipscomb had handed
the assured a capsule with directions to take it later and that some
hours thereafter assured swallowed the capsule and became ill, the
defendant offered testimony that while assured was suffering intensely, he said: "Dr. Lipscomb killed me with a capsule he gave
me tonight; and Guy Jack had my life insured, and hired Dr.
Lipscomb to kill me." The trial court admitted the declaration and
the Appellate Court affirmed. 21 Occasionally, also, there is a case
where a statement by an injured man that he had done frequently
before without mishap the act which on this occasion caused his
"aSee cases collected in 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 133 (1909); 76 A. L. R. 1129.

1131 (1932).

There is a conflict of authority as to the admissibility of a

statement which is in form an opinion or conclusion although in fact a

mere shorthand method of describing the speaker's personal experience.
See Cromeenes v. San Pedro, etc., R. Co., 37 Utah 475, 109 Pac. 10 (1910),
admitting; Field v. North Coast Transportation Co., 164 Wash. 123, 2
P. (2d) 672 (1931) rejecting. A few cases are collected in 42 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 917, 932, 938 (1913).
'Agassiz v. London Tramway Co., 21 W. R. 199 (1873).
"OState v. Bussey, 162 La. 393, 110 So. 626 (1926).
2Jack v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assn., 113 Fed. 49 (C. C. A. 5th,
1902).
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injury is received in favor of him or his administrator.2 There
are, however, not enough cases to justify any generalization for
an exception to this generally accepted requisite.
One question of growing importance concerns the necessity of
laying a foundation for the statement by showing by extrinsic
evidence that the exciting event occurred. In one of the earliest
and leading cases in this country, 28 the dissenting judge insisted,
among other things, that the statement itself was the only evidence
of the exciting occurrence. More recently, particularly in Workmen's Compensation cases, the claimant has had to rely upon the
statement of the deceased workman as the sole evidence of the
startling occurrence-which, also, was the only evidence that the
injury was received in the course of employment. Cases from Colorado, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, and North Carolina receive
the statement. 4 Illinois rejects it.2" On theory, of course, the
foundation should be laid by independent evidence unless the
judge in deciding preliminary questions is not bound by the rules
of evidence." But theory may well have to give way to practical
considerations and to the policy which regards every injury that
occurs while a man is employed as prima facie compensable.
In the seventh class, the res gesti terminology is applied to
declarations of a state of mind. This is probably due to two groups
of cases: (1) Those in the fourth class in which the legal significance of conduct depends upon the intent or other mental condition
which motivates it; (2) those in which the state of mind of a person
may be independently relevant and the court regards the words or
other sounds uttered by him on the same basis as other physical
manifestations, such as blushing or turning pale, or otherwise exhibiting by facial expression involuntary symptoms of a subjective condition like pain, anger, pleasure, fear, or surprise. In
the former group the courts may insist upon contemporaneousness. Thus some jurisdictions, for example, Maine, reject declarations of intent to abandon an old or to acquire a new domicile
unless they accompany nonverbal conduct which is independently
relevant upon the issue. -7 In most such cases, the intent with
2
Chapman v. Bimel-Ashcroft Mfg. Co., 263 S. W. 993 (Mo. S. Ct., 1924).
-Insurance Co. v. Mosley, 8 Wall. 397 (1869).
"Industrial Commission v. Diveley, 88 Colo. 190, 294 Pac. 532 (1930);
National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Hedges, 233 Ky. 840, 27 S. W. (2d)
422 (1930); Young v. Stewart, 191 N. C. 297, 131 S. E. 735 (1926); Bunker
v. Motor Wheel Corp., 231 Mich. 334, 204 N. W. 110 (1925).
'Selz-Schwab & Co. v. Industrial Commission, 326 Ill. 120, 156 N. E.
763 2 (1927).
1See Maguire and Epstein, Rules of Evidence in Preliminary Controversies as to Admissibility (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 1101, 1122-1125.
"See note 5, supra.
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which the nonverbal act is done is decisive. In others, the reason
which induces the act, rather than the intent, may be important.
Thus, where receivers of poultry refused to sell poultry to marketmen, it was essential to know whether the refusal was made
because the marketmen were selling to unapproved retailers. The
declarations of the receivers to the marketm'en explaining why
they were refusing to sell were admitted. 28 Again in two Alabama
cases, 20 the plaintiff was suing the defendant for wrongfully causing X to discharge plaintiff from X's employ. Evidence was offered that X, when discharging plaintiff, stated that he was doing
so because defendant, in one case, had threatened to boycott X,
and, in the other, had threatened to cancel X's liability insurance,
unless X discharged plaintiff. Now, plainly, this was unadulterated hearsay, if offered to prove that defendant had made any
such threats, and would not come within striking distance of any
recognized exception. If, however, it was otherwise shown that
defendant had made the threats and that X had discharged plaintiff, X's statements as to his reason for discharging plaintiff,
made in the process of discharging him, were declarations of X's
then existing state of mind. They were relevant to show the relation between defendant's threats and X's action to be that of cause
and effect. They accompanied X's action and determined its legal
significance. And for this purpose they were admissible, although
subject to the danger of misuse by the jury.
The same danger of misuse is found in numerous cases where
the speaker's state of mind is important although the statement
evidencing it accompanies no otherwise relevant action. In actions
for alienation of affection the words of the person whose affections
have fled may indicate their abiding place or flight before defendant entered the scene, or their transfer and resting place thereafter. Sometimes the statement will be a direct assertion of the
speaker's affection or hatred for either plaintiff or defendant or
both; or it may be a narrative of past events which indicate a
present state of mind. If the latter, there is always danger that
they may be regarded by the trier of fact as evidence of the happening of the events. Thus, where the wife told the husband that
she had gone automobile riding with defendant, had dined with
him, received flowers from him, and intended to keep on accepting
the attentions and favors which he was able to give and plaintiff
'Greater New York Live
States, 47 F. (2d) 156 (C. C.
Grocery v. Carroll,
2"Hill
States Fidelity & Guaranty
(1921).

Poultry Chamber of Commerce v. United
A. 2d, 1931).
223 Ala. 376, 136 So. 789 (1931); United
Co. v. Millonas, 206 Ala. 147, 89 So. 732

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
was not, this statement could not be received as evidence of the
happening of these events; but it was admissible as evidence of the
wife's mental or emotional attitude at the time toward both plaintiff and defendant.30 If thus limited the statements of fact, whether
she believed them or not, would show lack of proper marital affection for the husband; if she believed them, they would tend to
show an improper emotional attitude toward the defendant. In
either event they would be just as admissible as her direct assertion of her intent. And all the modern cases are tending to admit
direct assertions of a state of mind if they are made naturally and
without circumstances of suspicion.
One subdivision of this group has a separate history, namely,
declarations of pain. Some courts have made the practically impossible distinction between so-called animal utterances and coherent statements, on the theory that the former are involuntary.
Some restrict admissibility to declarations made to a physician
for the purpose of treatment; and Minnesota has declared that
the only coherent statements of subjective symptoms that can be
received are those which (1) are made to a physician for purposes of treatment, (2) relate exclusively to the then existing
condition, and (3) are accompanied by expert opinion testimony
of the physician based in part upon them. 1 The Minnesota court
takes the position that in all such instances there is so much likelihood that the statement will be consciously false or exaggerated
that it must be subject to the double check of (1) expected medical
aid based upon it, and (2) the opinion of the physician, open to
cross-examination, as to the correspondence between the declarant's
statement of subjective symptoms and his objective symptoms
observed and observable by the physician. Almost all the courts,
however, are satisfied to receive all declarations of present subjective symptoms when made to a physician for purposes of treatment; and a very heavy majority receive such statements to whomever made, except when made for the purpose of qualifying a witness to testify. There are a goodly number of states which admit
statements of past symptoms when made to a physician for purposes of treatment. Indeed, in the Kraettli case 32 the court said:
3OAdkins v. Brett, 184 Cal. 252, 193 Pac. 251 (1920).

The jury must on

request be cautioned not to use it for any other purpose, and when the

danger of misuse obviously outweighs the value of legitimate use, the
evidence may well be rejected. Wendell v. Brown, 142 Wash. 391, 253 Pac.
452 (1927).
"Sund v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co., 164 Minn. 24, 204

N. W. 628 (1925).
"nKraettli v. North Coast Transportation Company, 166 Wash. 186, 6
P. (2d) 609, 80 A. L. R. 1520 (1932).
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"In no decision or test that we have been able to find . ..has it
ever been held that physicians called for the purpose of effecting
a cure of a patient are not permitted to testify as to statements
of the patient's past pain and suffering made to them by the patient." The court could not have been expected to be acquainted
with Atlanta, Knoxville and Northern Railway Company v. Gardner,83 where declarations of both present and past pain were held
inadmissible even when made to a physician for the purposes of
treatment; but it must have had Mr. Wigmore's text at hand, for
it cited sections 667 and 668 in support of another proposition.
In Section 1719, Mr. Wigmore in speaking of the requirement in
some states that statements of present pain, to be admissible, must
be made to a physician, says that the Massachusetts case upon
which the limitation is based applied it "merely to statements of
past 'conditions and suffering' (which, as we shall see, are not
admitted except in Massachusetts and a few other states)." And
in Section 1722 he says that statements of past pain "are no better
than statements of any other past events ...There is in Massachusetts (and a few other jurisdictions) a modification of the preceding rule where the statements are made to a physician." Of course,
no implication is intended that the discovery of these authorities
would have caused the Washington court to reach a different result,
for in the later portion of the decision they adhered to a rule
upon which they conceded they were opposed by the United States
Supreme Court and most of the federal courts. They held it proper
to permit the physician, who had been called as an, expert and
who got his information from an examination made solely to qualify him to testify as an expert, to relate the history of past subjective (and, indeed, objective) symptoms as part of the basis upon
which he formed the expert opinion concerning the patient's condition. The patient's statement is concededly not admissible for
its truth; and the jury is to be instructed that it must consider
it only as part of the data to be used in their evaluation of the
physician's opinion testimony. No doubt this ruling is theoretically correct. No doubt, also, the opposing rulings amount to
nothing as protective devices if the patient is available as a witness,
the skirfor, as Mr. Justice Rossman of Oregon has said: "...
mishes back and forth to exclude, or admit, such testimony are
largely in the nature of sham battles, for if the testimony should
be excluded by the application of the rule suggested by the defendant it would promptly make its appearance in the form of a
hypothetical question accompanied by the physician's opinion'"122 Ga. 82, 49 S. E. 818 (1904).
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answer." 34 The difficulty with this sort of evidence is, at its root,
a difficulty that cannot be solved by any exclusionary rule. As
long as persons can be found able to qualify as medical experts
and willing to testify to anything necessary to the case of the party
calling them, and as long as litigants desire to distort the facts,
no rules excluding assertions of pain, suffering, anxiety, or other
subjective conditions will be effective.
Usually where words accompanying a nonverbal act are offered
to show the speaker's state of mind, his state of mind at the instant
of the utterance is an issue. In many cases, however, his state of
mind at that time is material only as the basis for an inference that
it existed at some other time theretofore or thereafter, and in some
cases as a basis for a further inference to an objective fact or condition. For example, if in a will contest it is important to show
that at the date of the alleged will the testator had either affection
or hatred for a person named therein as legatee or entirely omitted
therefrom, the testator's relevant utterances on occasions prior to
that date, if received to show his then existing state of mind, will
be useless to the proponent unless the trier can infer that the state
of mind at the moment of the utterance continued up to the time
of executing the will. Likewise, the expression of a threat or plan
by X to kill Y will have no tendency to show that X, rather than
defendant, did kill Y unless the trier first concludes that X's state
of mind at the time of the threat continued up to the time of the
killing, and further, that Y acted in accordance with that state of
mind. The cases in which this double inference is permitted are
legion. There is a deal of nonsense contained in the books in attempts to show that in such instances no hearsay is involved. For
instance, the Chief Justice of Pennsylvania in 1923 was dealing
for the Court with a declaration by a slain woman made "shortly
before the day of the fatal encounter" that she intended "to shoot
the accused and then kill herself." ' 3 The trial court had rejected
the evidence though defendant's defense was that the woman had
carried out her intention, and had shot the accused in the head. In
reversing, the Chief Justice said: ". . . the existence of such a design becomes material and evidence tending to prove it is admissible.
"Testimony of the kind under discussion-when not introduced
to prove directly the truth of matters therein asserted, but merely
to show declarations alleged to be relevant as a basis of an inference to be drawn therefrom-is admissible without regard to
4
Reid v. Yellow Cab Company, 131 Ore. 27, 45, 279 Pac. 635, 67 A. L.
R. 1 (1929).
*,Commonwealth v. Santos, 275 Pa. 515, 119 At. 596 (1923).

RES GESTAF
the hearsay rule .. . For instance, in this case the evidence in
question is admissible because suicidal intent, like any other purpose, is a mental condition, which can manifest itself, primarily,
only through some act or word of the person in question; hence,
relevant acts or words may be proved as the basis of an inference
that the state of mind, or intention did in fact exist from which
fact and others in the case, the conclusion may be drawn that the
design contended for had been carried into execution." Does the
learned Chief Justice mean that any fact, the existence of which
is only circumstantial evidence of an ultimate fact in issue, can
be shown by hearsay? If so, he stands alone. Or does he mean
that when offered to prove the existence of a given state of mind
in X, a statement by X directly asserting the existence of that state
of mind is not hearsay? If so, he rejects every definition of hearsay
that has ever been framed. Does he mean that the statement of X
is not offered to prove directly that X has such a state of mind
but only as circumstantial evidence that he believes he has it, from
which belief it may be inferred that he really has it? If so, this is
sheer foolishness. Certainly hearsay is involved in the assertion.
The rule under discussion admits as an exception to the hearsay
rule the declaration of a presently existing state of mind made
naturally and without circumstances of suspicion; and the obscuring phraseology of the Chief Justice is an attempt to reach the
desirable result without appearing to do violence to previous unwise pronouncements.
Once the state of mind existing at the time of the utterance is
established, is the process of inferring its continuance and later
action in accord therewith any but a logical process? Does it
involve untested perception, memory, narration, or veracity, from
the dangers of which cross-examination may protect? Obviously,
none of these, except perhaps something analagous to memory.
Memory is the retention in the mind of past sense impressions, and
is in a way a continuation of a once existing condition of mind;
here the trier is asked to make a deduction of the retention or continuance of a particular state of mind without giving the adversary any opportunity to test by cross-examination the retentive
quality of that mind or the strength of purpose or the effect of
intervening events. To object on this ground, however, seems
rather fanciful. Consequently, it seems reasonable to conclude
that in cases of this character there is one and only one hearsay
step, and that is covered by a recognized exception.
Suppose, however, the planned or contemplated action requires
the co-operation of another. In the famous Hillmon case,3S one
'-145 U. S. 285, 12 S. Ct. 909 (1892).
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Walters had written to his sweetheart and relatives letters stating
that he intended to leave Wichita, Kansas, with Hillmon, on a
trip through Colorado and the West. These were offered as evidence that he was with Hillmon at Crooked Creek and that the
person killed there was Walters and not Hillmon. The Supreme
Court held it reversible error to reject the letters after other evidence tending to show that Walters went with Hillmon had been
introduced. The letters were held to be competent "as evidence
that shortly before the time when the other evidence tended to
show that he went away, he had the intention of going, and of
going with Hillmon, which made it more probable both that he
did go and that he went with Hillmon, than if there had been no
proof of such intention." The court said that the declaration was
as direct evidence of his intention as his own testimony that he
had then had that intention would have been, thus making the
hearsay character of the declaration as clear as possible. It quoted,
however, from the Mosley case :S7"Such declarations are regarded
as verbal acts, and are as competent as any other testimony, when
relevant to the issue. Their truth or falsity is an inquiry for the
jury." Now, it must be too apparent for argument that all utterances are verbal acts; and the phrase, as commonly used by the
courts, has only less "convenient obscurity" than res gestoe because it happens to be English instead of Latin. In State v.
Power,38 the Washington court indulges in similar verbiage. There
the statement of a woman just before leaving Idaho for Spokane,
that "she was in trouble, and was going to Spokane to be treated
by Dr. Power" was received against Dr. Power in a prosecution
for manslaughter by abortion. The court said that it was certainly
proper to show that she went to Spokane and placed herself under
Dr. Power's treatment. "The preparation she made for going, her
condition of health at that time, and her conduct and demeanor,
were likewise matters properly admissible in evidence, as a part of
the history of the case and necessary to its general understanding.
On the same principle, her declarations made at the time she was
preparing for the journey could be shown. They were in the nature
of verbal acts, explanatory of what she was doing and of her
object and purpose, and are part of the res gestte of this particular
part of the entire transaction." What does all this mean except
that her intention may be shown by her words, and that her intention is relevant upon the issue of her own later conduct? In what
way can it have the remotest bearing upon the defendant's con"Insurance Company v. Mosley, 8 Wall. 397 (1869).
2824 Wash. 34, 63 Pac. 1112 (1901), cited and quoted from with approval in State v. Paschall, 182 Wash. 304, 47 Pac. 15 (1935).
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duct, except to show that he probably had an opportunity to treat
the declarant? As Chief Justice Start of Mlinnesota put it in
State v. Hayward,8 9 where the murdered person's statement of an
intention to meet the defendant was admitted: "But it was relevant to the issue to show that she did meet the defendant, and
evidence of her declarations of an intention and purpose to meet
him was admissible as original evidence to prove that she did in
fact intend to meet him ... To sustain it on the ground that the
statement of the deceased was part of the res gest~e is, in my judgment, to assign a wrong reason for a correct conclusion, which
may lead to complications in future cases." The Supreme Court of
Connecticut expressed it even more clearly :40 "The existence of a
plan or intention to do a thing is relevant to show that the act was
probably done as planned. The plan or intention, being a condition
of mind, may be evidenced, under an exception to the hearsay rule,
by the person's own statement as to its existence. A declaration
indicating a present intention to do a particular act in the immediate future, made in apparent good faith and not for self-serving
purposes, is admissible to prove that the act was in fact performed.
It is admissible, not as a part of the res geste, but as a fact relevant to a fact in issue.' It should, of course, be noted that such
declarations are practically never sufficient in and of themselves,
to prove the intended conduct. In practically all the cases there
has been other evidence of which the declared intention is corroborative. And in many of them the courts have emphasized this fact.
It will be observed that in the situations just discussed, the inference is from a state of mind at a given date to a state of mind
at a later date, thence to action or other conduct. May the process
be reversed? Consider Rawson v. Haigh.41 In this early English
case the question was whether a debtor had committed an act of
bankruptcy. This depended upon whether he departed the realm
in order to avoid his creditors. It was shown that on the evening
of a day in which he was negotiating with them in London, he
took the night boat for Paris. He wrote or left word that his son
would continue the negotiations. Some two weeks later he wrote a
letter in which he expressed the fear that his creditors might seek
his arrest; and about two weeks thereafter another letter in which
he stated that he dared not return to London for fear of his creditors. These letters were received as tending to show that he left
the realm with the intent to avoid his creditors. Mr. Justice Park
(not the renowned Baron Parke) held that these letters were part
362 Minn. 474, 497, 65 N. W. 63, 70 (1895).
"°State v. Journey, 115 Conn. 344, 161 At. 515 (1932).
"2 Bing. 99 (C. P., 1824).
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of the res geste of departing the realm, that they were contemporaneous with the departure, for in this connection the courts had not
tied down the notion of contemporaneousness to any strict or definite period of time. This is, of course, a plain abuse of language
in an attempt to bring the decision within the terms of a formula.
All that is necessary under this technique is to think in geologic
periods; then any utterance made within historic times can be
called contemporaneous with any other known event. The explanation of the case by modern commentators is very simple. The
declaration of fear some thirty days after the departure, though
hearsay, is admissible evidence of his fear at that date. The like
is true as to the declaration of fear two weeks earlier. Taken in
conjunction with the circumstances of his departure, his state of
fear at these two dates justifies the inference of fear of his creditors at the time of departure, and this warrants an inference
of intention to avoid them by departing. Logically, there is
nothing to prevent the inference that a specific state of mind
had its origin at a time prior to its manifestation by action
or words. It all depends upon the circumstances. They may be
such that the memory of the person in question will be heavily
involved, and the dangers of relying upon the quality of memory
of a person who has not been subject to cross-examination may be
considerable. In most cases there is little danger, but in a few, the
court has gone to doubtful extremes in reversing for the exclusion
of such evidence. For example, in Mower v. Mower,42 the trial
judge was reversed because he rejected self-serving declarations
made two and seven years after the act in question when offered
to show (1) declarant's state of mind at the times when the declarations were uttered and (2) the same state of mind at the time
of the earlier act. The most frequent application of this rule is in
will contests where the statements of the testator made after the
date of a will or after the date of an alleged revocation are offered to show (1) that at the time of the declaration he had such
a state of mind as to be more than normally subject to undue
influence, or had either an animus revocandi or a belief in the
continued existence of his will, and (2) that at the date of execution or physical destruction of the document, he had the same
state of mind. Here, too, many courts are careful to charge that
the testator's declaration that undue influence was exercised on
him or that he had revoked his will or that his will was then in
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Utah 260, 228 Pae. 911 (1924).
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existence is not to be taken as evidence of the fact stated, but only
as evidence of his then condition of mind. 8
The Kansas Supreme Court does not stop there. It seems expressly to adopt Mr. Wigmore's theory. In holding that a posttestamentary statement directly asserting execution or content is
admissible to show either execution or content, or both, of a lost
will, it places its decision not upon a separate exception to the
hearsay rule for such statements, but says: "Each (such statement) shows the testator's state of mind, from which we may naturally infer the existence of the fact or the doing of the act which
produced that belief or state of mind.14 4 Examine this reasoning.
Begin with a situation where the speaker's assertion is not a direct
assertion of the fact to be proved. Take an actual English case
in another field, which in 1914 was decided by the House of Lords.
One Alice Lloyd gave birth to an illegitimate child after X, its
alleged father, had been killed in the course of his employment.
In a proceeding to recover for the child under the Workmen's
Compensation Act, evidence was admitted that Alice gave birth to
the child, that before X's death she informed X that she was pregnant, and that X then promised to marry her. There was also
evidence that he had expressed to other witnesses his intention to
marry Alice after knowing of her pregnancy. Obviously the conversation between Alice and X was not hearsay when offered as
evidence of X's knowledge of the fact of her pregnancy; and the
contract to marry was not hearsay for the words were offered
merely to show the exchange of promises. The direct declarations
of intent were receivable under an exception to the hearsay rule.
This evidence was all clearly relevant to show that X intended to
marry her; it was likewise relevant and of strong probative value
to show X's belief that he was the father of her unborn child,
for it is a rare occasion, outside of romantic novels and dramas,
when a man promises to marry a woman whom he knows to be
with child by another. Since none of X's statements was a narrative and none was intended to express the proposition that he was
the father of the child, his veracity is not involved after we have
once accepted his direct assertions of his intent, as we must under
the recognized exception for declarations of a present state of
mind. Errors as to narration are no more likely than in any situation where a witness on the stand is repeating words used by
another. X's perceptions and memory are, of course, heavily involved. It is clear that X could not have known that he was the
father; but it is too clear for argument that he must have known
"See Re Wayne's Estate, 134 Ore. 464, 291 Pac. 356, 294 Pac. 590 (1930),
and cases collected in 79 A. L.

. 1427, 1447 (1932).

"Atherton v. Gaslin, 194 Ky. 460, 239 S. W. 771 (1922).
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whether he had intercourse with Alice. Granted that his veracity
is not in question, the only risks lie in possible mistakes in perception and memory. Of the former there is no reasonable possibility. Though the statement was made some months after the act,
there is under the circumstances practically no danger of errors
in memory. Consequently, the evidence is much more trustworthy
than that received under many, if not most, of the recognized
exceptions to hearsay. And the House of Lords held it admissible."
The same analysis will show the value and trustworthiness of a
testator's conduct or his declarations of intent circumstantially
indicating his belief in the existence or revocation of his will,
though in some instances the testator's mental condition may make
reliance upon his memory rather hazardous.
But what of the Kansas case where the utterance is a narrative
of a past event, and the theory of its reception forbids the trier
to accept it directly but requires the trier first to consider whether
the speaker believed what he was saying, and if that is answered
in the affirmative, whether his belief was induced by the actual
happening of the event? Of course, it would be ridiculous to expect
a jury to go through any such thought processes; and even a
learned judge would find some difficulty in doing so. In Shepard
v. United States, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit seems to have sanctioned some such notion. The trial judge
had admitted Mrs: Shepard's declaration, "Dr. Shepard has poisoned me." The Court of Appeals held that it was not admissible
as a dying declaration, as the trial judge had thought, but on another theory. The defense had introduced declarations of Mrs.
Shepard showing or tending to show an intent to commit suicide.
The line of inference which the appellate court thought justifiable
seems to be thus: From Mrs. Shepard's declaratiton that defendant
poisoned her, to her belief that defendant poisoned her, thence to
her belief that her condition was not due to her own act, thence
to the fact that she had done nothing to cause her condition. The
Supreme Court of the United States, 46 however, reversed the conviction. It first held that the statement was inadmissbile as a dying
declaration, that it had been received as such, and that the Government should not now under the circumstances seek to justify it
on a ground of which defendant was not apprised at the trial.
It then went on to say that the Government might by proper evi"Lloyd v. Powell Duffryn Steam Coal Company, Limited, L. R. 1914
App. Cas. 733 (1914). The Court of Appeals had rejected the evidence.
L. R. (1913) 2. K. B. 130. The Court of Appeals considered the case
as involving only a declaration against interest. The grounds upon
which the House of Lords held it receivable are a bit difficult to discover
from the reported opinions.
4290 U. S. 96, 54 S. Ct. 22 (1933).
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dence show a persistence of her will to live, but not by such a
declaration. "It will not do to say that the jury might accept the
declarations for any light that they cast upon the existence of a
vital urge, and reject them to the extent that they charged the
death to some one else. Discrimination so subtle is a feat beyond
the compass of ordinary minds. The reverberating clang of those
accusatory words would drown all weaker sounds. It is for ordinary minds, and not for psychoanalysts, that our rules of evidence
are framed." Of course, this is a striking case and one too extreme
to furnish a basis for generalization; but the court went on to consider the precedents and concluded: "Declarations of intention,
casting light upon the future, have been sharply distinguished
from declarations of memory, pointing backward to the past. There
would be an end, or nearly that, to the rule against hearsay if the
distinction were ignored."
It seems safe to conclude, then, that a declaration of a presently
existing state of mind is generally admissible when the state of
mind (1) is relevant and material of itself without the accompaniment of any inference to be drawn from it; or (2) is to be used
as the basis for a relevant and material inference that it continued
to exist for a reasonable time after the declaration; or (3) is to
be used as the basis for such an inference of its continuance and
action of the declarant in accord with it, even though such action
requires the co-operation of a third person; or (4) is to be used as
the basis for a relevant and material inference that it existed for
a reasonable time prior to the declaration. There is also both
authority and reason for admitting a declaration of intention when
the intention is to be used as the basis for a relevant and material
inference that a certain belief caused the intention and the further
inference that the belief was created by a given external event. It
is doubtful on authority (and on reason, so long as the hearsay rule
is accepted) whether the declaration of a state of mind other than
that of intention is to be received if the state of mind is to be used
as the basis for a deduction that it was created by a given external
event; and the cases which receive the post-testamentary declaration of a testator as evidence of the facts therein stated on the theory that it is circumstantial evidence of the belief of the testator
in its truth, which in turn is evidence of the happening of the
event narrated, threaten the destruction of the hearsay rule. That
may be a consummation devoutly to be wished, but it should be
accomplished by more forthright methods.t
'One of a series of papers upon the law of evidence presented by

Professor Morgan to -the Seattle Bar in July, 1936, revised by the author
for publication. The first of this series appeared in the January, 1937,
issue of the REVIEW; others will appear in subsequent issues.

